The relationship between a country and others is actually the one maintaining its national interests. These national interests contain security, political, economic, and cultural dimensions, and they serve as the most influential factor deciding a country's relations with others.
Among all these elements, security is the most important, with economic interests coming in second place.
According to the criteria of security interest, countries can be mainly divided into three categories: countries sharing more common interests than conflicts; countries sharing less common interests than conflicts; countries enjoying no direct security interests.
For countries who share more common security interests than conflicts, the essence of their strategic relations is co-operation regardless of what kind of economic ties they maintain.
A typical example of this category is Japan-US relations. Though being economic rivals, especially during the 1980s, the two largest global economies have maintained a good relationship.
The Sino-Russian strategic partnership in the post-Cold War era can also prove that judgment.
Sino-Russian trade volume has been much smaller than the one between China and other countries like the United States and Japan, and that between Russia and European countries. The two countries' strategic partnership, however, has remained closer than their strategic ties with other major powers.
For those countries sharing more security conflicts than common interests, they will strategically guard against each other or even remain strategical rivals no matter how their economic ties develop.
Take Sino-US relations in the 1980s and the post-Cold War era as an example. The trade volume between the two countries grew fourfold from 1979 to 1988, and it increased by 5.2 times from 1990 to 1999.
However, the two periods of time witnessed different developments of their strategic relationship, despite that the economic relations remaining stable.
During the first period, the two countries strengthened their mutual co-operation. Both of them faced a common threat at this time - the former Soviet Union.
During the second period, they remained mutually on guard against each other. Their common enemy disappeared due to the collapse of the former largest socialist country.
Certainly, without common economic interests, confrontation between the two countries became more obvious if security conflicts occurred, which was demonstrated by US-Soviet Union relations during the Cold War.
Although common economic interests between two countries can influence bilateral strategic relationships to some extent, the essence of their relations can not be affected.
For those countries untouched by direct security interests, their strategic ties are not expected to be easily escalated into a confrontation at least, which at most remain in peaceful competition.
Under this circumstance, their economic ties will play a part in deciding whether their strategic relationship remains co-operative or otherwise.
For instance, without direct security interests because of their geographic locations, China and European countries have long maintained good economic ties.
Thus, China and Germany, its largest European trading partner, have developed a relationship of co-operation. Sharing many political interests, China and France have also established a relatively good co-operative relationship.
One country can maintain its national interests by mainly depending on its comprehensive national strength. Specifically, it can maintain its security interests by means of military strength and maintain economic interests by relying on the economic development.
The economic power of a country alone cannot effectively safeguard its security interests.
For example, Japan has long remained the world's second largest economy, but it needs US security protection.
And the United States has effectively maintained its security by relying on its powerful military muscle, but not its enormous economic strength.
Notably, military and economic strength can neither replace each other, and nor can their mutual transformation be realized within a short period of time. Nevertheless, the increase of economic strength can expose the shortage of military strength.
A country's military force may no longer maintain its ever-increasing demand for security brought about by its expansion of economic interests.
Not only do strategic relations between countries and their economic ties have no inevitable connection, but also they can develop in an opposite direction.
That can be demonstrated by Sino-US relations since the end of the Cold War. The two countries have economically maintained a development momentum, but their strategic relationship has undergone twists and turns at the same period of time.
However, economic ties between two countries can possibly influence bilateral security co-operation.
The close economic ties between the two countries will surely expand their common interests, but economic frictions between them will possibly increase accordingly, which will affect their bilateral security co-operation if further deteriorating.
That can be proved by Sino-Japanese relations in the post-Cold War period.
With the deepening of Sino-Japanese economic interdependence since the end of the Cold War, thanks to the increase of Japan's investment in China and the latter's exports to the former, the "China threat" theory has become popular in Japan.
The peddlers of this fallacy claim that increasing Japanese investment in China will lead to Japan's economic decline, thus posing a serious threat to their country.
With such a fallacy, Japan has strengthened its psychological guard against China, and even made a territorial dispute with China over the ownership of China's Diaoyu Islands.
All these examples send a clear message: security interests serve as a foundation for bilateral ties between countries, and economic interest lies behind; defence ability is a main means to maintain national security; close economic ties cannot inevitably lead to the consolidation of bilateral strategic ties, and it can possibly increase bilateral conflicts.
The author is director of the Institute of International Studies at Tsinghua University.
(YAN XUETONG 01-03-2003)
